

PSF: SAFE: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, March 1944

Draft
10-6-43

7655 *Secret file*
SI PLAN FOR CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

~~SECRET~~

A

General Outline

SI activities in China and Southeast Asia will be directed from two general headquarters, one at Chungking and the other at New Delhi.

1. Activities directed from Chungking will include:

Activities in South China

Main base will be at Chungking, and principal intermediate bases at Kunming and Kweilin.

Activities in Burma--Thailand--Indo-China--Malaya

Main base will be at Kunming.

Activities in North China

Bases yet to be determined.

Activities in Manchuria and Korea

Bases yet to be determined.

2. Activities directed from New Delhi will include:

Activities in Burma--Thailand--Malaya

Base in Assam with Eifler. Close collaboration will be maintained with the corresponding activities based on Kunming. It may be that these activities will eventually be brought under the direction of the base at Kunming, but this decision will be deferred.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of 007622

cla Lh., 7/30/73 (Donnelly to Reed)

By jsh Date 8/7/73

Activities in Sumatra

Main base will be at Colombo.

B

Initial Steps

The initial steps to be taken are:

1. To send Judge Allman with Drummond, Gleysteen and Sargent to Chungking, as economic and technical adviser on General Stilwell's Staff. Judge Allman will establish the Chungking General Headquarters and the Chungking base for South China activities and will promptly move to establish the intermediate bases at Kunming and Kweilin for South China activities. He will also exercise general supervision over the prompt establishment of the Kunming base for activities in Burma--Thailand--Indo-China--Malaya.

2. To send Mr. Scholz, together with Chartrand, Pittard, Major Glass and Capt. Wester to Eifler and to Kunming. Scholz will discuss possibilities with Eifler, and then proceed to Kunming to establish his base. He may leave Chartrand and possibly either Pittard or Wester with Eifler to begin the development of activities at that base. He will proceed to Kunming with the others, to establish his headquarters there in accordance with the general plan of Project FE No. 23. A small number of Thais who have been thoroughly trained in this country will be sent out either initially or very soon thereafter.

3. To send Lieut. Koke, with one American and five Indonesians, to Colombo, to report to Ripley there. Ripley will be instructed to establish headquarters at Colombo and to undertake activities in accordance with the general plan of Project FE No. 22.

4. To direct Hutcheson to establish general headquarters at New Delhi.

C

Timetable for Further Development

It is contemplated that the foregoing activities, once properly started, will expand rapidly, and will involve the employment, within six months to a year, of 180 officers, 570 enlisted men, a number of civilians and hundreds of natives. The precise rate and direction of development will be governed, of course, by the wishes of the Theater Commanders, the advice of our men on the ground, and the availability of transportation and military personnel.

N O T E

A detailed amplification of this outline is in preparation and will be ready by this evening. It will include an integration of these plans with the radio intelligence network for the 10th and 14th Air Forces previously prepared by Colonel Lowman at the request of General Davidson.

The headquarters for S.I. activities in India may be shifted from New Delhi to Eifler's base at Assam.

We are planning to send ten men as geologists in connection with the oil field developments in Kansu, Sinkiang, and Shensi provinces. Six would be in the area adjacent to Lanchow where oil development is now being considerably expanded, two at Urumchi on the Russian border, and two in Shensi near Yen-an, general headquarters of the Communist forces. These men are to be sent to China in conjunction with Air Transport Command project, to provide facilities for aviation gasoline, to meet transport and combat requirements.

O. S. S. folder

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file
Secret*

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a statement made by Abram Hewitt, whom I think you know. He was in Sweden for some time and these notes represent a meeting with Dr. Kersten, attending physician of Himmler, and the efforts of Kersten to induce Hewitt to go to Germany.

We have told Hewitt that he should not do this as I assumed you would not care to have Americans in Germany on such a basis.

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

WJ

CONTACT WITH HIMMLER

I. Background

What follows can best be understood in the light of the general Swedish position and the organization of Swedish economy. While in a political sense the Swedes are freedom-loving people and consequently more than 90% pro-United Nations, there is in Sweden a very deep seated fear and distrust of Russia and the motives of the existing Russian government. The Swedes, therefore, being a small nation, are looking for a counter-weight to Russia after the war. They believe that the only effective counter-weight for them is Germany. On this account and due to the fact that a very big proportion of Swedish foreign trade is conducted with Germany and that there are very heavy Swedish investments in Germany, the Swedes are anxious that Germany should not be totally destroyed. In fact, the Swedes would like to see the war brought to an end with the least possible destruction of Germany.

Swedish economy is organized in three general blocks: (a) Government monopolies, including railroads, telephones, telegraphs, electric power, alcohol and

tobacco; (b) Cooperatives covering a large percentage of consumers' goods, such as flour mills, groceries, etc.; and (c) Private banking, mining and manufacturing. This last field is largely dominated by organizations controlled by Enskilda Banken. This bank is controlled and managed by the Wallenberg family who have been bankers for a long time and whose foreign connections are the most important and extensive of any group in Sweden.

The present managing director of the bank is Jakob Wallenberg, who is a bachelor about 54 years old. He is responsible for the business of the bank dealing with the European continent, including Germany. His younger brother, Marcus Wallenberg, is responsible for the business of the bank dealing with the English-speaking world and South America.

Jakob Wallenberg is the permanent negotiator of the Swedish government with the German government in matters pertaining to trading agreements, barter, etc. In this position he has frequent contacts with the German government and visits Germany about four or five times a year. In his private capacity as a leading banker, he is in touch with a cross-section of the high ranking German

financial and manufacturing interests.

I had known Jakob Wallenberg in 1932 when I was in Stockholm representing a trustee in bankruptcy of the International Match Corporation, the American holding company for the Ivar Kreuger interests. As a result of reorganization of the Kreuger interests, the Wallenberg's took over control of the Swedish Match Company and International Match Corporation, including their subsidiaries throughout the world. When I first saw Wallenberg in August 1943, he indicated that cells were forming in Germany for the purpose of overthrowing Hitler and he asked me if I would be willing to meet with representatives of these cells. I reported this fact at once to the American Minister in Stockholm, Mr. Herschel Johnson. He cabled the State Department at once, but no answer was received in Stockholm. At the end of this first interview with Wallenberg, he stated that his friends in Germany were somewhat perplexed about Himmler's true motives. While he was supposed to be entirely loyal to Hitler, certain changes were taking place in Germany which could only raise ques-

tions in the minds of intelligent observers. Wallenberg's statement was made in vague terms of this sort. I took it to mean that there was some question as to Himmler's intention, eventually to oust Hitler and to take over the government himself.

Shortly after this conversation, Himmler was appointed Minister of the Interior, continuing to hold his other posts as Chief of the Gestapo and Chief of the SS. After about three months had gone by, I called Wallenberg's attention to the fact that nothing more had been heard of his proposal that I should meet with representatives of the cells organizing in Germany to overthrow Hitler. I asked if this meant that, following his appointment as Minister of the Interior, Himmler had succeeded in liquidating all of these cells, and that there was no longer in Germany any underground movement or group of cells worth talking about. Wallenberg confirmed that this was true, saying that, so far as he knew, there was no longer any organized resistance to the Nazis in Germany.

He gave it as his opinion that the only alterna-

tives to Hitler in Germany were (a) the army, and (b) Himmler. He stated that communications between high army officers were under the control and supervision of Himmler's men; that whenever an army cell began to form which was hostile to Hitler, Himmler let it form until he was sure he knew who all the members were. These officers were then relieved of their commands. This statement of Himmler's relations with the army and his control of communications between the officers was confirmed to me by two other Swedes, who were very well informed about existing conditions in Germany.

Wallenberg's statement that the only alternatives to Hitler were (a) the army, and (b) Himmler, was confirmed by every well informed Swede I knew who discussed the matter with me.

Wallenberg's statements were further confirmed by the fact that the Swedes, outside their official legation and consulate, had built their government connections in Germany largely around Himmler and his organization.

The Swedes coming out of Germany reported that nearly everyone in Germany thought that Germany could not

win the war. However, they did not feel that their position was hopeless and would continue to fight. Their hopes were based on (1) a successful resistance to the Russians after shortening their line somewhere about the German border; (2) that they would be able to repulse the invasion launched from England; and (3) the devastating effects of their so-called "secret weapon" when used. The gossip in Germany was that this weapon would only be used when the invasion from England was launched.

Finally, all Swedes informed about Germany agreed in reporting that the doctrine of "unconditional surrender", announced by the United Nations, had resulted in uniting everyone in Germany behind Hitler at a time when the hardships of the war and the natural forces of disintegration would otherwise be disrupting Germany.

II. Dr. Kersten

In view of the foregoing, I was not surprised when about the beginning of October 1943 during a call at the office of a very close friend of mine, who was one of the key men in the Wallenberg organization, he handed me a card which read, "Dr. Felix Kersten, Medecinolrad". My

friend explained that this was the highest Finnish medical title, there being only three living men who hold it. He explained that while he himself was not acquainted with the doctor personally, he did know that he was one of the most powerful men in Germany. He went on to say that seven Swedish engineers employed by the Swedish Match Subsidiary in Poland had been caught and convicted of working with the Polish Underground. The Director of the Swedish Match Monopoly in Germany, Alva Moller, a mutual friend of ours, had gone to the doctor with a plea to have the death sentence of the Swedish engineers commuted, and this had been done. In addition, the doctor had arranged for two Dutch children, the son and daughter of the former Dutch Minister to Italy, to be given safe conduct through Germany to join their sister in Sweden. This had been done without delay, and I saw the children myself to verify this account. They did not, of course, know who had arranged for their passage but I did verify that they had been trying to get out of Switzerland for more than three years without success.

Since the doctor was renowned as a nerve specialist, an appointment was arranged for him to examine me on

the pretext that I had vertebrae in my back which were causing me pain. The meeting took place and I found that the doctor spoke Finnish, Russian, Dutch and German but no English. All conversations between us took place in German. The doctor agreed to give me a course of treatment which he said would extend for about six weeks. This he did, giving me a manual therapy treatment which was designed to get blood into the nerves. The treatment was very painful and lasted for about an hour each day except Sundays.

During the course of these treatments the doctor told me about his life, as follows:

He had been a very poor boy in Finland and had suffered considerable hardships in order to complete his medical education. The development of this manual therapy treatment through the nervous system was entirely his own work. His practice had grown until, in 1928, he was called into consultation by the Court in Holland to examine Henry, the Prince Consort. He gave the Prince a course of manual therapy which was so successful that he was retained to become the "Leibarzt" to the Prince. He settled in The

Hague where he remained except for trips to Italy where he treated Mussolini, Ciano and other high Italian government officials, and also members and officials of the Rumanian court and government.

In 1938, he had treated Himmler with great success. The result was that, when the Germans overran Holland in 1940, the Gestapo notified him that they would not be responsible for the safety of his family or himself unless he moved to Berlin. This he did in 1941. He showed me a Gestapo paper requiring him to move. His purpose in showing this paper probably was to try to persuade me that his removal to Berlin was not voluntary.

He became "Leibarzt" to Himmler and was retained by the SS organization to treat 21 of their officials each year. This required him to spend a great deal of his time at SS Headquarters. His contract provided for a salary of 60,000 marks a year, and he was given six times the normal gasoline ration for doctors.

He explained his presence in Sweden by saying that Alva Moller had come to him and had offered him 100,000 Swedish kroner if he could succeed in persuading

Himmler and Hitler to commute the sentence of death for the seven Swedish engineers. He reported that he had talked with Himmler several times and had interviewed Hitler two or three times as well on this matter. He stated that he had refused the offer of 100,000 kroner point blank.

When the death sentence was commuted, the Swedes, through Alva Moller, asked if there was not something they could do for him, and invited him to spend a two months' vacation in Sweden.

What I think happened was that he reported the offer of 100,000 kroner to Himmler, who told him to refuse it, but arranged to get the engineers' death sentences commuted. Himmler knew that the Swedes would have to offer the doctor something else besides money, and that there was very little else they could do except invite him for a visit to Sweden. Undoubtedly, it suited Himmler's purpose very well to have a representative in Stockholm who was not a German citizen, and a Finnish citizen would be much more able to establish contact with Americans.

During the course of six weeks' treatment, the

doctor told me a good deal about Himmler. Himmler had started life as an agricultural student, and had remained throughout his life keenly interested in questions of race and heredity. He was fanatically anti-Russian, having a great fear of the consequences of the high Russian birth rate, and disliking the threatened mixture of Slav blood with German blood. On the other hand, he had a great liking for the Anglo-Saxons because of their similarity of blood and racial characteristics with the Germans. Himmler had stated repeatedly to the doctor what a pity it was that Germans had to fight Englishmen and Americans, who were phsycially so like the Germans.

Contrary to most members of the Gestapo, Himmler was completely honest. He lived on a salary of 36,000 marks a year, and had no interest in accumulating money. Furthermore, he was completely loyal to his wife, a woman some 10 years older than Himmler.

The doctor said that most of the ministers in the German government, such as Ley, were totally unimportant. Himmler's relations with Goebbels and Ribbentrop were very bad as there was acute jealousy on each side. I

gathered that Goering was no longer very important as a vital force in Germany, and hence did not count a great deal in Himmler's calculations one way or another.

Martin Bormann, on the other hand, had been put in by Himmler in the party chancery under Hess, and after Hess' imprisonment in England, Bormann had taken his place. So far as the doctor knew, Bormann was still a Himmler man. My Swedish friends had told me that the SS had been expanded enormously and they believed included 1,500,000 men as early as January 1943. The doctor reported that there were over 2,000,000 men in the SS in October 1943, and that about 600,000 more men were in the Gestapo, all under Himmler's control and command.

Himmler realized that Germany could not win the war. He was anxious to salvage as much as possible from the wreck and knew that the United Nations would not deal with Hitler on any conditions. I told the doctor that Himmler had a very bad press indeed, in both England and America, and that it was very doubtful whether the American or British governments would deal with Himmler on any terms.

The doctor urged me to come to Germany to discuss Himmler's position with him, and to see whether a settlement might not be possible. He indicated clearly that, on certain conditions, Himmler was prepared to overthrow Hitler, and that he was the only man who had power to do so in Germany. I told him that I did not represent the American government, and that I did not even know what the current policies of the American government were, and that on this account, it would be pointless for me to talk with Himmler. The doctor then suggested that I return to Washington, familiarize myself with the position of the American government and come back to Europe.

He mentioned to me that Himmler was organizing his own government within the SS, and that his two chief advisors on foreign affairs were Ober Fuehrer Walter Schellenberg and Dr. Braun; that he would be glad to get one of these men to come to Stockholm to confirm what he had been saying to me. Within a couple of days, he told me that Schellenberg was in Stockholm and would like to see me.

I saw Colonel Schellenberg twice and he confirmed everything that Dr. Kersten had been telling me. He also pressed me to come to Germany to talk with Himmler. I told him that I was by no means certain that there would be any point in my coming even at a later date, and that I might have trouble getting out of Stockholm due to the very tight priority situation on the British planes. He at once offered to put me out through Lisbon, giving me safe conduct through Germany and France. He suggested that, when I come back to Europe, I come back to Lisbon, as the Gestapo organization was very good there and was, in his opinion, very poor in Stockholm. He gave me the names of 2 of his men in Lisbon, Schroeder and Breisky, to get in touch with them. He said that they would have a German passport ready for me.

The doctor reported that Prince Wied, the German Minister to Stockholm, had come with a peace proposal from the Russians to SS Headquarters about the time of Stalingrand, and that von Papen had come with another one from Ankara in May 1943. The outlines of the proposals were that Germany should take about one-half the Baltic

countries to the north of East Prussia; that Poland should be divided according to the 1939 lines; that Russia should demand the whole coast to the Black Sea, including the mouth of the Danube, and should go as far as Constantinople and Salonika, and should also have a port on the Adriatic. Ribbentrop and Goebbels had been in favor of accepting these proposals, while Himmler and Hitler were against them.

The Germans calculated that, if the Russians continued an all-out offensive, which they have in fact done, their reserves would be exhausted towards the end of April 1944, and that the Eastern Front might develop into a stale-mate in the summer of 1944.

The doctor also reported that British and American bombing of Germany was resulting in a very large increase in communism, as when people have their homes destroyed, as well as all their personal property, they are automatically thrown upon the state to provide them with everything they need.

Himmler's policy was that he intended to keep order in Germany under the existing government as long as

possible, and was prepared to shoot 20 or 30 million Germans to do so. However, when the time came that he believed that further military resistance was futile, he intended to destroy all of the private property in the occupied countries and in Germany, in order to produce a mass wave of communism. He would then announce himself as a communist, and throw his lot in with the Russians. The Germans believed that, if it became necessary to do this, that with a superior technical ability and organizing capacity, they could succeed in dominating greater Russian population and obtaining control on the vast Russians resources.

I made no promises or comment to the doctor or the Colonel, beyond stating that I would try to get back to Washington and see that the matter was brought to the attention of the President.

While it is obvious that conferences with Himmler are loaded with potential dynamite, nevertheless, I believe that there are enormous possible advantages in such a trip:

1. A great deal could be learned about the

German frame of mind, and the relations of the important Germans with each other. The weak links in their armor in a material, psychological and personal sense could be better explored in this way than in any other.

2. The possibilities of provoking a "putsch" or civil war in Germany could be explored at first hand. It is possible that this, if successful, might save hundreds of thousands of lives in connection with the coming invasion.

The disadvantage of such a trip would be the capital which the Germans could make out of it in their own press and radio. However, they are in a position to do that anyway if they choose to lie about it. An untruth is a consideration which has never yet weighed with them.

I hope that full consideration will be given to the possibilities of such a trip, and I am, of course, ready to discuss the matter and amplify this report in any way that is desired.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*File
Confidential*

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may find of interest the following report on the treatment of Russian prisoners in German prison camps.

At first, that is in 1941, the Russian prisoners were far more closely guarded than any others, and on the whole received far worse treatment. Most of them arrived in the prison camps in a pitiable condition. They were given completely inadequate food and practically no medical attention, and were forced to undertake heavy manual work, even though in most cases they were really too weak and too undernourished for this. Also the French and British prisoners were absolutely forbidden to do anything to help the Russian prisoners, but notwithstanding this there were many cases where the British and French shared their parcels with the Russians whenever they were able to get in contact with them.

The mortality among the Russian prisoners was

extremely high, and there seemed no doubt that the German government in its treatment of Russian prisoners violated all international conventions and is responsible for the death of thousands of Russians.

Those Russian prisoners who were eventually distributed in small groups on farms to help with the harvest and other farm work quickly gained the sympathy of the local population. People were tremendously struck with their extraordinary ability to learn German. Many spoke it better after two months than other prisoners after two years.

A great change has come about in the treatment of Russian prisoners dating from the initial Russian successes in December 1941. This is due in no small measure to the influence of the returning German soldiers who generally have a high admiration of their Russian opponents. My report refers to a characteristic incident which took place in the summer of 1943 at Karlsruhe, where a group of Russian and French prisoners were engaged in cleaning a street following a bombardment. A group of German soldiers from the East Front, disobeying all orders, went up


to the Russian prisoners, engaged them in conversation, and offered them cigarettes, and when anybody gives a cigarette away in Germany, it means a good deal.

In 1943, the Germans, taking into account the fact that the Russians received no packages from abroad, started to give them even larger rations of bread than the other prisoners, and generally improved the rations given the prisoners. At the same time, there has been a very noted change in the attitude of the German civilian public toward the prisoners. In general, the Russian prisoners have retained their faith in Stalin and their absolute confidence in final victory. Russian prisoners never complain of the regime, and have been on the whole impervious to German propaganda. In general the Russian prisoners can read and write, and take great pride in their country.

It is remarkable to note how many simple workers and peasants among the Russians know about Russian literature and take a real interest in it. One of their first requests made to the German authorities was for reading material. The Germans have also been highly impressed

with the qualifications of Russian technicians among the prisoners.

This above report, from someone who knows what he is talking about, generally conforms to other information on the subject which we have received.


William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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20 March 1944


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I give you below a report regarding the situation in Germany on March 1st. Our representative says the following:

"I reproduce this as received; the ideas are not mine, but come from a good source. The destruction in Berlin is enormous, but it is extraordinary to observe the fatalism with which the inhabitants accept the new situation. Thousands of persons live in the ruins, in cellars and in temporary shelters. At the beginning of the bombardment, there were many complaints. Now it seems the population is somewhat used to them. The common misfortune which all are sharing has the result that those who suffer are not openly complaining. The air bombardments have not caused any internal revolt. People are not any longer raising the question of who is responsible. The misery is so great and so general that it stifles reaction.

"Among persons above 40 years of age, i.e. those who have had knowledge of, or participated in, the war of 1914-18, there is a considerable proportion of anti-Hitler sentiment, even of defeatism. Persons of this generation are in open opposition to those of the generation which follows them, that is to say, those from 18 to 30

years old, who are mostly out-and-out Nazis. Now there is coming along a third generation - the young people from 12 to 18, who are far from being devoted to the present regime. In a school in Wiesbaden recently, the scholars agreed among themselves to beat up any of their school comrades who gave the Hitler salute. This young generation is not communist, because it does not know what communism is, but it has in it the elements of anarchism."



William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 March 1944

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
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Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you please hand it to him. Thank you.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a digest of discussions had by a representative of ours with King Peter:

King Peter's sojourn in Cairo was both futile and difficult for the following reasons:

(a) General Zivkovic was engaged in plots directed toward deposing Peter and placing Prince Tomislav, the brother of Peter, on the throne. Supposedly, Prince Tomislav is the bastard son of General Zivkovic and Queen Marie.

(b) Yugoslav army officers have been going over to Marshal Tito.

(c) Cabinet underlings have issued inflammatory decrees favoring General Mihailovic and have been affixing King Peter's signature to these decrees without his consent. This has made it hard to work for an understanding with Tito.

(d) The British have followed a policy of keeping King Peter practically a prisoner. King Peter verified newspaper accounts reporting this fact, although he was forced to refute them publicly at the time.

The foregoing factors, as well as his desire to affect American and British policy in favor of General Mihailovic and to expedite his marriage were responsible for his wishing to go back to London.

The agreed policy of the Purich cabinet and King Peter is the backing of General Mihailovic not only as a force opposed to the Nazis but also as a guarantee of Peter's ultimate return to the Yugoslav throne. They are also agreed on the policy of securing material assistance for Mihailovic. King Peter is of the opinion that the American and British policy of allowing the Soviet Union to take the initiative will result in the Anglo-Americans losing


a valuable sphere of influence. He claims that General Mihailovic's lack of activity has been caused by instructions from the Americans and British which urged him to save his strength until the invasion of Europe.

As a result of his discussion with Foreign Minister Eden, King Peter gained the impression that the British are in sympathy with these opinions, although they dare not take any action lest they affront the Soviet Union. King Peter feels that his only chance lies in the creation of a second front, which will give the British greater latitude of action. He feels that Eden, fundamentally, concurs with him, and he is optimistic that ultimately the problem of Yugoslavia will be solved in the way that he proposes.

King Peter intimated that if the British did not order him to do otherwise, he would keep Purich in his present position. He is extremely bitter against Simovic, whom he will not accept for a government position.

- 4 -

A cable sent recently by Slovene groups, assuring him of their loyalty and backing has enheartened King Peter a good deal. This cable was relayed to him by the Vatican.



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will note that in Hewitt's statement, he refers to Bormann as having obtained a strong position in Germany. Below is a brief biography of Bormann, which may give you some information not heretofore available:

Martin Bormann occupies at the present time a position as head of the Party Chancellery of the Nazi Party and is a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. He acts as the Deputy of the Fuhrer. He has been described both as the No. 2 and the No. 3 Nazi, and along with Himmler, Goring, and Goebbels is alleged to be the fourth member of the group designated to take over the control of Germany in the event of the death of Hitler. Press accounts in Sweden and elsewhere state that Bormann is the most important Nazi next to Hitler.

Life: Bormann, the son of a Lutheran farmer,

was born in Halberstadt on June 17, 1900. During the World War, he served in the artillery. After 1918, he became a student of agriculture and was appointed to manage an estate in Mecklenburg. He combined this work with activities in the Free Corps, as a member of the Ehrhardt Brigade and as section leader in the notorious Rossbach Brigade, terroristic military organizations which fought the Weimar Republic. In 1923, while still a member of the Rossbach group, he was convicted to committing a political murder and was sentenced to prison. After serving one year he was released. He immediately joined the Frontbann, as a racial para-military organization, and in 1925 became a member of the Nazi Party.


Position in Nazi Party: Bormann's rise to power was rapid in the Nazi Party. Two years after he joined the Party he became the Gau Press Chief (Gaupressobmann) in Thuringia. In 1928 he was appointed district leader and office manager (Bezirksleiter und Gaugeschaeftsfuehrer) in the Gau organization of Thuringia. In the same year he was made a member of the staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, a position

which he held until 1930. He was also director of the Hilfskasse of the Nazi Party. In 1933, Bormann was made a member of the Reichstag and became Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess (Stabsleiter des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers). Bormann worked with Hess in controlling Party affairs until the latter's flight to England. He holds the rank of Obergruppenfuhrer in both SS and SA, a Senior Group Leader.

After the flight of Hess, the office of Deputy Fuhrer remained vacant. A new office, Leader of the Party Chancellery (Leiter der Parteikanzlei) was created and Bormann was appointed to it. This office gives complete control over all Nazi Party affairs and the numerous party bureaucracy to him.

Political Position: The political viewpoint and position of Bormann in Nazi Germany has been made the subject of many rumors. He represents the SS group and since 1942, has purged many government officials, replacing them with SS men. He was reported to be associated with SS extremist factions. His closest friend is alleged

to be General Zeitzler, an ardent Nazi who rose to prominence in the German army after the defeat at Stalingrad. Cables from Bern in October 1943 state that Bormann was associated with Goring in sponsoring peace proposals to the Soviet Union and that he has quarrelled with von Ribbentrop over German foreign policy. In internal affairs, Bormann has advocated complete SS control in Germany. He represents the pagan group and has always shown a violent opposition to religion. His reputation as an ardent Nazi is not only demonstrated by his prominent position in the Party, but also by his record of violence and murder in politics which dates officially from the time he was nineteen years old.



William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file
Personal
Confidential*

21 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following notes consist mainly of statements of fact and generalizations about German troop morale, based upon interrogations of P's/W at PWE 326, Aversa, during the period of January 20 to February 20, 1944. Most of the generalizations have, however, been checked with interrogators of long experience.

A. VULNERABILITIES.

1. Non-Germans. In the past six months, the Wehrmacht seems to have been making increasing use of Volksdeutsche for combat service. The proportion of these troops to Germans varies from unit to unit, from 2 or 3 percent to 20 percent (including Austrians). In descending order of numbers the various nationalities are as follows: Austrians, Alsace-Lorrainers, Poles, Czechs, and Russians. Desertions run high in these groups.

2. Older men and men drawn from previously de-

ferred Occupations. It is well known that the Wehrmacht is drawing more heavily upon men in the thirties, a good proportion of whom are skilled workers previously deferred. In the course of a series of interrogations of skilled workers, it was found that the overwhelming majority of these men have poor morale because:

- a. Many of them have families to worry about.
- b. They find the transition to army life difficult at their age.
- c. They worry about the future more than the average younger soldier.
- d. They feel that when skilled workers are called up things must be going very badly indeed.

This group would be particularly susceptible to factual statements of production figures of the Allies, compared with facts about what is happening to the German production.

3. Untrained Men. Prisoners taken at the Anzio beachhead area brought reports that some of the units consisted of men who scarcely knew how to fire a gun. One

squadron leader reported that his group had been rushed to the front from a supply and quartermaster battalion and were completely unprepared for combat. Morale among these men was very low. When the time came for a counter-attack only two out of ten men followed him from the holes in which they were lying.

4. Supply. In some sectors, notably around Cassino, supplies come in irregularly because of the difficulty of the terrain and heavy artillery fire. Sectors in which these conditions prevail might be singled out by MO, but attacks would have to be carefully timed. In general, the supply situation seems to be fairly well in hand. There are remarkably few complaints about food from P's/W. The two most important items are cigarettes and Commisbrod. The latter especially occupies an important position in soldier morale. All P's/W, when comparing their food in the camp with that in the Wehrmacht, mention that the slab of white bread given them with meals at the camp is no substitute for Commisbrod, which is very filling.

In every other respect the food at the camp is

considered superior to their food in the Wehrmacht. Even the fanatics admit this.

5. The absence of the "Luftwaffe". The average P/W, though he admits the absence of air support in Italy, does not interpret this as very significant. P's/W whose morale was good before capture fall into the following categories on the matter:

a. The High Command knows what it is doing. If there is no Luftwaffe around there is good reason for it.

b. Some are more explicit, saying the reason is that it is being saved up for a future plan, or it is needed worse in Russia. The general state of mind expressed by P's/W suggests that the absence of the Luftwaffe is not a very important morale factor because it is not clearly interpreted as a sign of a serious breakdown. To make a successful attack on this theme, it would have to be shown that the Luftwaffe is not in Italy because the GAF simply doesn't have the planes.

Factual reports of bombing of aircraft plants in Germany without further comment might be more effective in this line than any propaganda editorializing.

6. The Officers. The average P/W has very little to say about officers of the Wehrmacht in general. He forms his opinion on the basis of his own immediate officers and on things he hears from his comrades in the battalion. The following reports from P's/W on officers do, however, exhibit characteristics general enough to form the basis of an MO attack:

a. The veteran soldiers do not think highly of the newer corps of officers. This is more significant than the typical "Second Looney" or "brasshat" gripe. It is based on comparison in combat conditions with previous campaigns.

b. It is commonly understood that officers must have political views favored by the party in order to get any place. Among the soldiers who are fed up with the party this had important implications in their relations with officers. Officers trained in NAPOLI have an

unsalubrious reputation, even with the unpolitical soldiers.

c. Apart from the usual "tough officer" yarn, two types of anti-officer stories recur in interrogations.

i. Stories of officers "collecting" large amounts of silks, linens, etc. to send home from Italy.

ii. Stories of officers lying to their troops about the strength and/or nature of the forces opposing them. Rare instances of cruelty on the part of officers might also be exploited.

7. Worries about Home. With the exception of worries about aerial bombardment these worries follow the usual pattern of soldier worries. Mail service appears to be adequate and spot-censored so that the soldiers in general feel they are getting news from their friends and relatives which is dependable and unworried by censorship. The Nazi propaganda line about the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by the Allies appears

to have had a minor boomerang effect on the soldiers. It is difficult to assess it, but the impression created by P's/W is that it has caused them to worry more than it has increased their determination to fight. It should be remembered, however, that prisoners are not ideal sources of information on this theme.

One worry about home does not seem to be very widespread. No instance of a prisoner who was afraid that his wife or girl was deceiving him with a foreign worker, French or other nationality has been encountered. Though this is difficult to discuss in interrogations, it never seems to have been the subject of conversations among the troops, nor are there any stories at the expense of "other guys". On the other hand, there is a good proportion of stories about French, Dutch, and Belgian girls and German soldiers. However, if any news stories from German papers on this theme can be found, it might be worth a try.

8. Frictions among the troops. Among the average run of troops, front line experience seems to make

ordinary frictions disappear in the general atmosphere of "we are all in the thing together". Tolerance of one's comrades is outstanding. There are no evidences that religious or regional frictions play a significant role in troop morale. Apart from the German-non-German split, the only others worth mentioning are the dislike of the fanatical Nazis who make any kind of frank discussion of the war or politics unpleasant, if not dangerous, and the dislike of the SS. The large majority of the soldiers, however, are fighting as "good Germans" and "doing their duty". The sense of sharing their troubles and the general front line camaraderie is much stronger than political or social differences.

9. Vergeltung. The long-promised Vergeltung is no longer taken seriously by the majority of the troops, and has given rise to a considerable number of jokes. The few who do believe in it neither constitute a worthwhile target nor is it likely that they would be susceptible to any sort of propaganda. The best possibility offered by this theme is as a part of another attack in which a humorous Vergeltung reference might be

effective.

10. Attitude toward Captivity. The average soldier is confident that if he is captured he will be well handled. American captivity has an especially good reputation, with the English a close second. Some of the prisoners from Cassino report that there were rumors that the Goums took no prisoners. In general, however, a good treatment is taken for granted. So much so that a few instances in which officers tried to harden their troops for combat by stories of bad treatment in captivity were reported by P's/W to have been flat failures. Propaganda making use of captivity promises should therefore avoid gilding the lily or even direct appeals based on its attractions, but should rather regard it as well established credit.

11. The Secret Weapon. The belief in a secret weapon of some sort is still fairly strong and the number of versions of what it is attest to the fact that it is a frequent subject of conversation. Prisoners have described it as a radio-guided plane which is one large bomb, a death ray, a new gas, a super long range rocket bomb, an "elec-

trical gun", and as an "atomic" bomb. It is significant that the number who regard it as a joke is far smaller than those who laugh at Vergeltung. The major weaknesses in the belief are the delay in its appearance and the large number of versions as to what it is.

B. STRENGTHS


1. Hopelessness of defeat. One of the major factors making for a stronger morale than one might otherwise expect is the feeling on the part of the average German that he is now fighting to save Germany from annihilation. He is fighting as a German and, as noted above, this tends to subordinate the whole Nazi question. If there were some inkling of hope for a defeated Germany, the appeal to stop dying for Hitler might have more effect; at present, however, the sense of doing his duty as a German is strong enough to put the disgust with the party, which many of them feel, definitely in the background. Blaming the party for the war also becomes comparatively unimportant to them. What matters is that if Germany loses the war she is done for. A majority of the prisoners no

longer believe in the possibility of a German victory. Many still think she can hold out if they all fight well. Others just don't see anything else to do.

2. Sense of Duty. Many prisoners are frank to admit that they do not like the war and would be glad to see it over quickly. They are unaware of any political implications, but are fighting simply because "It is their duty". This state of mind fits in with the one described above, but with many soldiers it is not causally related. That is, they usually describe themselves as "little people" and "unpolitical". The issues involved are not clear to them and they are relatively unaffected by Nazism. They went to war simply because the authorities told them it was necessary and it was their duty to respond. This group is generally unaffected by anti-Nazi or other ideological and political propaganda. Many of them come from agricultural districts, but the type is by no means confined to the peasantry.

3. Pride in being a good soldier. The average soldier is conscious of the fact that the German fighting

is an excellent one. He feels that his unit is more than a match for the enemy's. He takes pride in the efficiency and discipline of the troops.


William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 March 1944

O. S. S. folder

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file 1

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I attach a secret paper which I
think the President will want to know about.
Will you please hand it to him. Thank you.

Sincerely,

W. J. D.

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA, 007622

letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a secret paper which has been seen by no one but you. It contains a course of action that was discussed in the event the Bulgarian Government does not pull out of the war willingly.

W. J. Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA, 007622

letter of 6-26-73
By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 23, 1944.

SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN:

1. As requested by you this morning, I outline below certain facts not contained in the formal report of the mission of today's date, regarding my personal and intimate discussions with Monsieur Balabanoff, apart from the more formal relations which he had with the members of the mission. These facts are not known to my colleagues, and they are written here only for your information and that of the highest political authorities.

2. My principal effort, as you know, was to accomplish by mutual agreement the detachment of Bulgaria from the Axis. It was clear to me and to Monsieur Balabanoff that this might be impossible and that it might be necessary to consider forcible means. We discussed this problem fully. I asked him, in particular, whether he was prepared and able to form, with the Army, a new government to replace the present government and take control of the country. He replied that if necessary he was entirely ready to act in this way but that he first wished to try to convince the present government it should withdraw from the Axis, since he wished to avoid the horror of civil war in Bulgaria, and almost certain consequent occupation by Germany. If his friendly efforts failed, he said he would approach the Army with a view to a coup d'etat, pointing out to me, however, that no coup d'etat could succeed without the material aid from outside Bulgaria. He said that neither he nor the military leaders were in a position to supply the necessary material and that as a large number of army officers and government officials were now receiving regular supplementary compensation from Germany, some substitute arrangement must be made to continue this supplementary compensation since, in existing circumstances, their regular allowance from the Bulgarian government is wholly inadequate for their essential needs. I replied that I could not make any definite promises in the name of the United States, but that if he could satisfy me that in fact he could actually obtain the necessary support

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Letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1975

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for a successful coup d'etat, I would guarantee, from my personal fortune, a certain amount of money for the accomplishment of the end in view. He then stated that it was not a question of a sum which I could provide from my own funds, since the amount involved would be considerable, pointing out that it would be a question of life and death for many Bulgarian leaders, and the problem of supporting their families if they were killed. In addition, he remarked that as a private individual I could not supply the armament and munitions that would be needed since, at the present time, all Bulgarian military stocks are rigidly controlled by the Germans. In this connection, however, he told me it would be entirely possible to corrupt the German officers in control of Bulgarian army supplies and that in fact he had already perfected arrangements to that end, but that he lacked the essential funds. He also said that given a signal from the Allies that they were ready to land in reasonable force, his arrangements were such that he could encircle the German troops as they were then disposed in Bulgaria, and effect their capture or destruction by the Bulgarian army.

3. I asked Monsieur Balabanoff what specific assistance in money and material would be needed. He replied he could give no exact estimate but that a possible measure would be sufficient funds to maintain the army for three months. As the present military budget represents about \$200,000,000, this would mean about \$50,000,000, to which should be added some \$10,000,000 for use with high non-military officials. Obviously most of these funds would be spent in Levas but dollar exchange of perhaps \$10,000,000 should be reserved for payments outside Bulgaria. These estimates are on the basis of a coup d'etat against the Regency. If the Regency can be persuaded to participate in the new government, some provision must be made for their support. I might point out that for payments in Levas a special issue of currency could be printed in Washington and that this would require the provision of no immediate dollar equivalent. If necessary, I can assure you, in the strictest confidence, with the names of the army and government officials through whom Monsieur Balabanoff would make the necessary arrangements.

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By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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4. In addition, to covering the military and political considerations, I obtained directly from Bishop Andre the promise that he would arrange with the Synod all the necessary propaganda against Germany, in favor of the Allies (particularly the U. S.), either in support of the present government, if it joined the Allies, or in support of a new government favorable to the Allies which might be formed by Monsieur Balabanoff under a coup d'etat. There were two conditions to Bishop Andre's promise: first, that Monseigneur Stephan (President of the Synod) should be the president of the new Regency, if a new Regency were established, and second, that Monseigneur Neofit should be one of the Regents and hold the position of tutor to the King. To enable the first step to be taken without further delay, I personally provided Bishop Andre with the necessary credits through my former banking connections in Bulgaria. Should, however, the program be continued by direction of the Allies, any necessary further expenditures would, of course, be beyond my means and funds must be available from U. S. government sources.

5. To summarize, while the Balkan situation has changed greatly since my discussions with Monsieur Balabanoff and Bishop Andre, I still feel it is possible to accomplish the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the Axis, either by persuasion or by a coup d'etat, and in either case, the support of the Church, which I have arranged, would practically assure popular acceptance of the new government. Any policy directed to these ends, however, must be flexible and adjustable to changes in general political situation and it is, of course, essential that any such policy be agreed to in advance by the United States, Great Britain and Russia. In so far as Russia is concerned, I should add that the Russian Ambassador to Turkey informed Monsieur Balabanoff that he knew of my conversations with him and that he wished to advise him to go ahead quickly and complete the arrangements which the United States were trying to make through me.

If I can be of any further service, you have only to command me.

A. K.

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letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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24 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to see
that the President sees the attached memo-
randum.

Thank You.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan,
Director

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letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach a copy of a report submitted to me today by the group that was sent to establish connections with the Bulgarian representatives in Turkey.


William J. Donovan

Director

Enclosure

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letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 March 1944

General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

The undersigned members of the Special Mission sent pursuant to your instructions to the Middle and Near East last November for the purpose of establishing contact with Bulgarian authorities to ascertain whether Bulgaria could be detached from the Axis and brought to the side of the United Nations have the honor to report:

(1) The Mission reached Istanbul on 1 December 1943 and shortly thereafter opened communication with persons in Sofia with the result that the Bulgarian Prime Minister telegraphed M. Balabanoff, Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, requesting him to get in touch with Mr. Kouyoumdjisky. On 18 December, Mr. Kouyoumdjisky met M. Balabanoff in Ankara at the latter's request. M. Balabanoff, who is a close friend of Mr. Kouyoumdjisky, spoke with him frankly of Bulgaria's mistake in joining the Axis and asked if Mr. Kouyoumdjisky were in a position to help Bulgaria. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky replied that he could not discuss that matter with M. Balabanoff at that time, but that if qualified representatives of the Bulgarian Government should be sent to Istanbul he would confer with them. He suggested that the Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, M. Gouneff, and General Popoff (both close friends of Mr. Kouyoumdjisky's) might advantageously be the persons chosen. M. Balabanoff said he would telegraph and recommend such action to Sofia.

(2) No reply having been received from M. Balabanoff, the Mission made a second direct approach to Sofia toward the end of December. This time sending word to the Opposition Leaders, M. Mouchanoff and Bouroff (both likewise good friends of Mr. Kouyoumdjisky's). These men sent

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s special messenger to report it was impossible for them to cross the frontier personally but they would welcome further information from Mr. Kouyoumdjisky. The desired information was later forwarded to them and we know that they brought their influence to bear on the Government to act.

(3) On 29 January 1944, M. Balabanoff informed Mr. Kouyoumdjisky that he was in Istanbul en route to Sofia where his Government had recalled him urgently and that he was certain he would be questioned further about his discussions with Mr. Kouyoumdjisky. The latter pointed out that there had been no reply to the communication sent pursuant to his request of 18 December and that in such circumstances he had nothing additional to say. M. Balabanoff replied that he felt Bulgaria had made many serious errors of policy and that it was necessary that she withdraw from her present unhappy position as soon as possible. He said he would do his best in Sofia to persuade his Government to act favorable and that he hoped Mr. Kouyoumdjisky as a Bulgarian by birth would continue to help. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky stated he would do his utmost provided he received through M. Balabanoff a definite proposal from the Bulgarian Government.

(4) On 4 February, M. Balabanoff returned to Istanbul and arranged to meet Mr. Kouyoumdjisky the next day. At that meeting he said he had spoken at length with the Minister President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Heads of the most important political parties and the most important representatives of the Press, and in addition had talked with the Regents as a group and individually. He stated that he was convinced he had been able to change their views and to make them decide to change the present Bulgarian policy and to attempt to make an approach to the Allies. He added that the Regents and the Government had authorized and instructed him to inform Mr. Kouyoumdjisky that they understood the necessity for changing their policy and of getting rid of their Axis connection. He also said that he was authorized to state that the Regents and the Government were in agreement to discuss this sub-

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ject with the United States and asked Mr. Kouyoumdjisky what should next be done. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky replied that he wanted to know what the Bulgarian Army thought, whether the Regents had the Army with them and if so whether the Army would join the Allied Armies in expelling the Germans from Bulgaria at the proper moment. M. Balabanoff replied that the Army followed the Government and that there would be no difficulty on that score. He said he would telegraph to Sofia to send immediately two authorized representatives to discuss details. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and M. Balabanoff then considered at some length the identity of appropriate representatives.

In the course of this conversation, M. Balabanoff observed that Bulgaria's principal preoccupation was lest the country be destroyed and dismembered and that while he understood that no territorial questions could be considered, he wanted to record that view. M. Balabanoff also expressed the hope that the Mission would do whatever might be necessary to suspend the bombing pending the selection and arrival of Bulgarian representatives in Istanbul. He was informed that an appropriate telegram would be sent to Washington.

On 6 February, M. Balabanoff received Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and Major Gurfein and confirmed in substance his conversation of the previous day with Mr. Kouyoumdjisky reiterating that he had the definite mandate from his Government to discuss this matter and that he would communicate immediately with his Government asking that authorized representatives be sent at once. He also urged the greatest discretion on the part of all concerned lest word of the negotiations should reach the Germans.

(5) No reply having been received from Sofia through M. Balabanoff, he was visited again in Istanbul on 28 February by Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and Colonel Jadwin who then met him for the first time and identified himself as former Military Attache in Bulgaria. The introduction of Colonel Jadwin at this time made it possible for the Mission to emphasize the increasing official

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significance of its representation. In reply to Mr. Kouyoumdjisky's questions M. Balabanoff was unable to give any satisfactory explanation for the silence of his Government. He asked with obvious concern, however, whether the bombing of Sofia would be resumed if the Bulgarian Government sent no Mission. He was told this was purely military matter and could not be discussed. M. Balabanoff then asked if his Government could not send a small preliminary Mission could they send a large Mission to discuss details to which an affirmative answer was given. The possible identity of the Representatives was discussed as was the best place for a meeting. It was again emphasized by Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and Colonel Jadwin that any representatives must have a definite mandate from their Government. M. Balabanoff stated he would urge his Government again to take immediate action, pointing out that in his judgment negotiations should be started at once.

(6) For reasons of security -- there had been newspaper publicity in Istanbul regarding "peace feelers" without, however, specific reference to this Mission -- and also for psychological reasons the Mission decided to withdraw temporarily from Turkey. Accordingly, on 9 March Major Gurfein and Mr. Kouyoumdjisky left for Cairo and Colonel Jadwin followed a few days later after stopping in Ankara to deliver to M. Balabanoff the special message from the Secretary of State which you cabled to the Mission to the effect that if the Bulgarian Government should send a Mission to Cairo they would be received by representatives of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. M. Balabanoff seemed much pleased at this information and stated he would inform his Government immediately. It was explained to him that the message came from the highest authority, whereupon he observed that his Government should select important persons as members of the Mission and that they should be of such caliber and have such authority that they could discuss the matter from all angles. He was assured that the necessary transportation arrangements could be made if his Government should appoint a Mission and it was agreed with him that any further communication on the subject should be sent by him

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By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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to Consul General Berry in Istanbul who would immediately communicate it to the State Department in Washington.

It should be noted in connection with the foregoing that several important political developments occurred in the interval after the conversation between M. Balabanoff and Mr. Kouyoumdjisky of 5 February and the arrival of the Secretary of State's message and that these developments greatly confused the general situation. For example, the Finnish-Russian peace negotiations did not progress rapidly, and the Italian campaign was obviously meeting with difficulty, Marshal Tito declared himself in favor of a free and independent Macedonia and negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey reported in the Press to be leading to Turkey's entrance into the war broke down with the departure of the British Mission from Ankara. All of these events could obviously color the judgment of Bulgaria as to the proper time for acting in concert with the Allies. Moreover, certain Bulgarian officials delivered speeches on territorial questions even though it had been made clear to M. Balabanoff that such questions were out of order at that moment.

It is our judgment, however, that the Mission's primary objective has been accomplished, namely, the establishment of direct contact with the Bulgarian Government, the determination that in principle the Bulgarian Government desired to desert the Axis and the provision of a channel through which arrangements could be made for the dispatch of a Bulgarian Mission to Cairo to meet with British, American, and Russian delegates. We are of the opinion:

1. That the desire of the Bulgarian Government to join the Allies is sincere.
2. That action by Bulgaria in joining the Allies would be greatly accelerated if Bulgaria could be assured that there was no disposition on the part of the Allies to destroy and dismember her or to prevent the continuance of the present dynasty provided the Bulgarian people

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By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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decide in favor of the dynasty and that ultimate consideration of Bulgaria's claim to her 1912 boundaries is not definitely excluded.

3. That further considerable pressure could be brought on Bulgaria if she were informed that widespread bombing of Bulgarian targets would be resumed if prompt steps were not taken to send qualified representatives to Cairo.

4. That it would have immense effect on Bulgaria's action if it were known that the Allies were prepared to furnish men and materiel to assist in the expulsion of the Germans and the protection of Bulgaria from German reprisals. This consideration has particular significance at this moment in view of the Russian advance into Roumania and the reported occupation of Hungary by Germany.

5. That through Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and the contacts and connections established by him a practicable method now exists for the communication to the Bulgarian Government and influential individuals of the views of the Allies on the above or any other subjects which might influence Bulgaria in taking prompt action,

and we await your further instructions.

Respectfully yours,

Angel Kouyoumdjinsky C. C. Jadwin, Col., GSC Murray I. Gurfein
Major, AUS

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letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 March 1944

file →

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am sending you a memorandum for
the President. Will you please see that he
gets it. Thank you.

Sincerely,

WJ

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From our London office, we learn the following:

1. Effort is being made to construct the basis of a new government which will stand for the potential middle element between Tito and Purich. There are daily conversations in which the following persons participate: Snoj, Banjanin Vilder, Srdjan Budislavljevic, Milan Grol, Bogulyub Jeftitch, Slobodan Jovanovic, and Captain Kern. The first three are Serbs from Croatia or Bosnia, the second three are Serbs from Serbia. No Croats have been asked to participate in the discussions to date, on the theory that agreement must first be reached among the Serbian factions. Lambda is sure that Sutuj will join the group, but doubts that Krnjevic will do so.

2. The group's program is approximately as follows:

- a. Maintenance of friendly terms with the USSR.
- b. Mihailovic to be ultimately replaced as War Minister by a civilian. Grol might be his

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
- 2 -

successor.

c. Ultimate establishment of friendship with the Partisans.

d. Complete support to a Federal Yugoslavia, to which Bosnia would be added as the fourth unit, independent of both Zagreb and Belgrade.

3. Neither the King nor the British Foreign Office has been contacted by this group as yet; such steps, however, are planned to be taken very soon. They are afraid that more radical concessions to Tito will be insisted upon by the British, but the group is not ready at the present time to accept persons appointed by Tito into the new government. They feel that because cabinet members accompanied the King to London, there will be significant changes in the immediate future. Purich, Cicin Saint, and Milecevic are among the members who met with him. Serbs in London no longer resent the King's marriage."


William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

27 March 1944

file


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Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you please be kind
enough to bring to the attention of
the President the attached memorandum
on the Polish situation?

Sincerely,


William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA ltr 11/27/74
By *WBS* Date DEC 4 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

27 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From one of our members dealing with the Polish underground and with British SOE, I have received the following report which you may find of interest:

1. The Polish Premier, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, a representative Polish Peasant from Western Poland, formerly Chairman of the Agricultural Cooperative movement in Posnania, is respected.

He has made a good impression on British Cabinet Ministers, including Mr. Eden, and on other Government officials as well as in British Parliamentary and press circles. He is considered a calm and straightforward statesman, reliable and of sound judgment. He has convinced the British that he sincerely desires an understanding with Soviet Russia within the framework of United Nations unity, with the purpose of giving to the Polish Underground Army and the Polish people the possibility of effectively pursuing their fight on Polish territory against the common enemy, Germany.

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2. Premier Mikolajczyk has stated that he cannot act contrary to the will of the Polish people by making concessions irreconcilable with Poland's sovereign rights. He claims this would be repudiated by the Polish people and therefore become valueless to the United Nations, including the Soviets.

3. The Poles feel that mediation exclusively conducted by Prime Minister Churchill without the participation of the United States places the Polish Government in a somewhat difficult situation with the Polish people.


4. Recently the Authorities of the Polish underground, who had been informed of the pending visit to President Roosevelt of Premier Mikolajczyk, have asked the latter for explanations as to why he had postponed his visit, and expressed anxiety that the Polish Government was not maintaining the close contacts with the United States Government previously maintained by the late Premier General Sikorski.

5. We have been informed from reliable sources that Ambassador Ciechanowski, who spent three weeks in

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London, has been given a personal letter from Premier Mikolajczyk to the President, presenting the case of Poland. The Ambassador has also been instructed to ask that the President receive Premier Mikolajczyk on a short visit to Washington. The proposed visit would help dispel the undesirable impression created in Poland, among the Polish people abroad and among Americans of Polish descent, that the President and the United States Government had lost all interest in the fate of Poland and had entirely abandoned it to the British Government.


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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file 7
27 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to see that
the President sees the attached memorandum.

Sincerely

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S)
CIA ltr 21 Nov 1974
By *WBS* Date *JAN 29 1975*

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

27 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a cable received from our Istanbul representative, transmitting information concerning Rumania's request for assistance.

William J. Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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~~**SECRET**~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE March 25, 1944

FROM

ISTANBUL

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

For Donovan from Istanbul.

SECRET

The material below was given us by SOE to relay to you. On March 24th the following message, dated March 22nd from Budapest, reached Ankara: "With the King of Rumania's permission, Maniu asks that you place the matter below before representatives of the United States and Britain, realizing that every sign points to Rumania being requested, as Hungary was, to accept German troops in their country and that Germany will try to establish still firmer collaboration and will try in every way possible to force Rumania to expend more energy in battling the Russians.

Insofar as it related to Allied interest, Germany's occupation of Rumania on the heels of her occupation of Hungary and to be followed by her occupation of Bulgaria, will indicate the completion of Germany's preparations for Balkan defense. We must know, to give us some basis upon which to organize the possibility of trying to resist German occupation, if we can depend upon a minimum of assistance from Americans and British. We appreciate the fact that we cannot plan immediately upon a military operation of any considerable size. However, limited but prompt assistance from air forces and air borne troops could at least be considered.

To provide for the eventuality of a retreat to Yugoslavia, resistance would be attempted in the zone at Oltenia and the Banat.

It is possible that a mass invasion of Rumania by the German forces may be postponed for a little while until the Germans are well established in Hungary. Consequently, it is not too late even now to make arrangements for military assistance from the U.S. and Britain."

I have not told anyone in the Mediterranean Theater about the foregoing; am depending upon you to take action on it.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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PAGE

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

ISTANBUL

FROM

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

RECEIVED

It appears that our representative in Istanbul has arranged with Britain SOE to secure confidential copies of communications between British and Rumanians. Summarized the messages show:

Message #1 relates his meeting with the Governments of the Allies.

Message #2 recommends that no controversies be permitted with the Hungarian people.

Message #3 contains a strong recommendation to have both Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu give up the idea of visiting Hitler, since their absence might serve as the opportunity to cease control of the country. In addition this message says Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu should not take any action without first discussing it with the Allied governments.

Message #61 from Maniu to SOE is a request for a statement of the extent of the assistance which the Allies are ready to offer. Message #62 reports the receipt of the 1st messages from Sterbey and the decision of Marshal Antonescu not to make a stand on the Dneister. Message #63 reports that Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu have received instructions to visit Hitler, against which he had previously warned them. Message #65, dated the 23rd, reports that both Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu have put off their visit for the time being.

A message from Wilson for Maniu warned strongly against having Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu visit Hitler.

Message for SOE from Marshal Antonescu through Criztescu asks for the Allies' reaction to the latest developments within Hungary, and asks for a statement of the political and military assistance which can be guaranteed. Criztescu also says that he does not think that the Germans are in control in Hungary. He goes on to say that the danger of an attack by the Hungarians is apparently removed, and that Rumania now has before her the supreme choice without having any idea as to how much assistance she can be assured or what to expect.

March 24th cable #69 for you and Sterbey from Maniu. "Cable #2 from Sterbey, parts 1 through 3 and cable #61, parts 1 through 3 from you reached here after Marshal Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu had left for Hitler. They will continue the war against the Allies if in agreement with Hitler. Then, Maniu has firmly decided to react by unseating Marshal Antonescu. He wants to know upon what Allied aid he can depend in this case. Dechazlelcu is well as are the 2 officers, also".

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Could you show the attached
to the President? Thank you.

Buc

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA Hr 007622
By *APJ* Date MAY 15 1974

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P.S.F. Date C. A. S. Jones

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


Secret

30 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum to the President
regarding the extent of Irish cooperation with this
office. Will you please hand this to him. Thank you.


William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 March 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following memorandum will set forth the extent of Irish cooperation with this office. I thought you might want to have it in view of the present situation.

I

"Early in 1943 the Office of Strategic Services' representative in Eire and Mr. David Gray, American Minister to Eire, were separately approached by Mr. Joseph Walshe, Eire's Secretary for External Affairs, who informed them that the Irish were willing to cooperate with the United States Government in intelligence matters. Mr. Gray did not want to be directly concerned but approved the establishment of liaison by the OSS.

II

"In March 1943 conversations were held in Dublin between the American Minister, the Secretary for External Affairs, the Commanding Officer of OSS London, the OSS representative in Dublin, the Chief of the Irish Army Intelligence, and the Chief Inspector of the Irish Police Force at various times and in various combinations.

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E.O. 13526

Authority 7/14/04 CIA Oversight Unit
NARA PMH Date 6/13/2016

~~SECRET~~

III

"As a result of these conferences, the OSS representative in Dublin was from time to time subsequently furnished with information requested or volunteered. Since, at the American Minister's request, the representative soon moved his base to London, some of the information he received was sent through the Irish pouch to the OSS London office. The balance was given him either before he left, or on subsequent liaison trips to Dublin. Information received included the following subjects among others:

German agents in Ireland, their training, instructions, equipment (including radio equipment) and ciphers; radio activities, illicit radios, interception, and direction finding; the Irish Republican Army; complete lists of Axis nationals, persons of Axis origin, and Axis sympathizers in Eire, their jobs and where possible their views and activities; Axis diplomatic and Consular representatives and their known contacts; map of the Coast Watching System; reports on shipping activities; Axis propaganda; submarine activity off the Irish coast to the extent known; Irish prisoners of war in Germany and known activities of Irishmen in Germany; political groups in Ireland with Fascist leanings or ideologies; interviews with persons who had recently left the Continent including the Irishmen recently parachuted by the Germans into Ireland;

lists of German aviators interned; lists of and interviews with survivors of a naval action off the Bay of Biscay picked up by an Irish ship.

IV

"As a result of further conversations in Dublin last fall, the Irish made available to the OSS in the greatest confidence reports from their diplomatic and consular representatives on the Continent. So far the information contained in these reports has been of use primarily as confirmation of information from other sources. However, the potentialities are important.

V


"The cooperation in intelligence matters offered and given by the Irish has been very full. It should be pointed out that we did not offer the Irish information in return and have given them little. This office understands that Irish cooperation with the British both in intelligence and security matters has also been very full. It antedated, of course, cooperation with us. The British have stated that they were satisfied that the security situation in Ireland was under control. After the recent parachuting by the Germans of two Irishmen into Eire, but before the delivery of the American note, the Irish alerted the Army, Defense Forces, and the Coast Watching Service.

VI

"Since the delivery of the American note, the Irish have

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offered their prompt cooperation in adopting whatever security measures may be recommended by us and by the British. The American Minister has been informed and has given his approval of our making the recommendations. The Commanding Officer of OSS London is now working on this matter in conjunction with the British."


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 March 1944

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E.O. 13526

Authority 7/14/09 CIA Oversight Visit
NARA PMH Date 6/13/2012

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William J. Donovan
Director

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
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached reports add to our knowledge of the present state of affairs in France. They were received from an OSS representative in Spain.



William J. Donovan
Director

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9 March 1944

REPORT FROM ARGUS TO REGIS ON CONVERSATIONS
WITH FRENCH RESISTANCE LEADER

Today I had two long talks with one of the important leaders of the French Resistance Movement. He is motivated by determination to drive German forces from French soil and is not, unlike many others, occupied with details of internal French politics. He crossed the Pyrenees the first week in February and is in Spain clandestinely en route to Algiers. The heads of the French Mission here and the French Red Cross both vouch for him. I shall refer to him as "Delphi". The following facts were brought out in conversation, principally in answer to specific questions:

Attitude of members of French Resistance Movement toward Americans:

All branches, particularly those in the Maquis, are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the British and Americans. This feeling is being replaced by growing admiration for the Russians, who are considered alone to be bearing the brunt of military operations against the German Army. There is disappointment over the lag in Italy, and Allied generalship is criticized as "No better than the French that lost the Battle of France." Delphi believes this feeling will vanish as soon as a successful invasion of France is begun from the West and that the Allied Armies will meet with support from a unified France beyond anything that was either promised or

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imaginable in 1940.

Delphi warned against additional "insulting" explanatory propaganda, which only provokes the reaction "Words, words, more words! When are they coming?" There was bitter reaction against the recent "alerte"* from London and Algiers, which was interpreted by patriots to indicate Allied military operations for approximately February 15. French patriots, particularly in the Alps and in Northern and Southern section of the Atlantic Coast area, responded at once. The German police and their Vichy-French allies were watching for such activity, and numerous resistance leaders were arrested. Many Resistance Organizations have had to be reorganized under new leaders. Delphi urged unequivocally that no further calls-to-arms be made until time is ripe for action under a carefully prepared strategic plan. He is going to Algiers and then to London to bring this matter to the attention of the proper authorities.

Needs of Resistance Groups

The essential needs now are arms accompanied by instructions for their use. Only one-fourth of the enlisted strength of the Maquis is armed. Its members are strong, fairly well-fed and adequately clothed, but need pre D-Day training in use of such small arms as will be made available to them. Earlier reports about insufficient food and clothing were dismissed by Delphi as pre-1941, before the underground had discovered how to secure

*Comment: This was not an announcement, but a call to prepare for D-Day.

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supplies from the Vichy Police, Army and Youth Organization stocks. He cited instances of raids on warehouses to obtain blankets which were made into uniforms, how Youth Organization leaders of the "Compagnon de France" turned over shoes to the Maquis; how cattle was slaughtered for food and stocks of fuel destroyed after removing that needed by the Maquis. The only real need is arms, ammunition and radios for communication.

I told Delphi that I had heard there was sentiment against arming the Resistance Movement due to acts of banditry committed by common criminals under the guise of membership in the Maquis, and that these acts had aroused antagonism of the average Frenchman against the Resistance movement. He attributed these statements to HENRIOT, Vichy Minister of Propaganda, and DARNAND, the new Police Chief, as a means of discrediting the Maquis. Delphi stated that in regions where the Maquis was dominant, it maintained law and order. He cited the punishment of individuals for clandestine slaughter of beef cattle for sale on the Black Market. He cited other instances reminiscent of the activities of the Night Riders in the South during the Reconstruction Period.

French Estimate of American Attitude, and Reaction of Different French Groups.

Delphi stated that the average intelligent Frenchman believed the American Government still had some sympathy for Vichy,

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and did not have a "violent aversion" to Vichy or even to LAVAL. Only on this basis could they explain our reticence in dealing officially with DE GAULLE. It was widely rumored in France that the United States had planned to unite all Frenchmen by persuading MARSHAL PETAIN to proceed to North Africa to set up his Government there at the time of the invasion of Algeria. Delphi said that would have been the best solution for France and that DE GAULLE would then have joined forces with the MARSHAL. However, PETAIN was either too old, too cowardly or too closely held a prisoner by his entourage and the Germans to take this one logical and patriotic step. PETAIN now has no political importance in the active sense.

Since the plan to effect an understanding between PETAIN and DE GAULLE did not succeed, it is believed in France that the State Department, with the approval of PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, is seeking a new intermediary solution between DE GAULLE and what is left of Vichy. CHAUTEUPS in America is supposed to have access to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT and to be urging a deal with ex-leaders of the French Parliament who are still in France, such as ANATOLE DE MONZIE and HERRIOT, if the latter is not too old. With these are usually grouped (in present French opinion) certain Synarchiste industrialists and bankers, particularly of the Banque d'Into-Chine group, such as BAUDOUIN and LAURENT. These politicians, industrialists

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and bankers are supposed to be the chosen group for the transitional government of a liberated France. These rumors still persisted at the end of January.

Although I told Delphi I was convinced the facts were different from the plan he reported, he thought it would be of value to outline the reactions of various sections of French opinion to any such plan. He stated that apart from the bankers, industrialists and politicians mentioned, there exists no group in France which would accept with approval any such program.

The important political groups (other than underground) are collaborationist, and represent only 40,000 individuals. These collaborationist groups are:

1. The PPF (Partie Populaire Francaise), led by DORIOT.
2. The RNP (Rassemblement Nationale Populaire), led by DEAT.
3. The police and armed "Milice", now controlled by DARNAND with active German support.
4. The organized press, directed by JEAN LUCHAIRE.

Until September 1943 these groups struggled among themselves for privileges under German protection. The overwhelming opposition of the people and the growing power of organized resistance forced these groups to present a program in Paris to the

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Germans. This program included (1) introduction of their leaders into the Vichy Government; (2) Cleansing (epuration) of the French administration to make room for a nuclei of their supporters and (3) the arming of the "Milice" and its integration into a single, armed, repressive force.

It is believed that the Germans accepted this plan, but insisted that LAVAL be kept as an indispensable political leader. None of the leaders of these groups has had sufficient political experience to govern, even as a puppet. If LAVAL is not kept, the Germans would have to impose a Gauleiter on France, and all French collaborationism would disappear.

The first result of German acceptance was to make DARNAND head of the State Police. He was entrusted with repression of patriot activities. HENRIOT, the active spokesman of this group, was placed in charge of French propaganda and radio activities, and the "Milice" has been organized in the Northern Zone, hitherto closed to French police forces.

DARNAND was a great French patriot. He served brilliantly in both wars, as a non-com and Lieutenant in World War I (where he won every French decoration for bravery) and was one of the outstanding leaders of the Corps Francs, and in the present war. He apparently has become an opportunist upon whose vanity LAVAL and others have been able to play. Today there is no more convinced and dangerous a pro-German leader in France.

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Opposed to these collaborationist elements are the great mass of French people. The group of greatest importance is the large group of intelligent men and women, mostly professional people, between 30 and 40, who make up the intellectual elite. Prior to 1939 their interest in politics was negative; now they lead the resistance. While opposed to Synarchism on the one hand, they are equally opposed to the return of the pre-war form of parliamentary government. They favor State Socialism for all industries of national importance (railways, electrical power, insurance companies, mines, etc.) Their platform appeals to the laborer. It gives organized labor a large part in the future French State, with self-chosen representatives. The group is studying a plan for a new constitution patterned on that of the United States. They want none of the Third Republic, and laugh when reminded by the parliamentarian "has-beens" of Algiers that PRESIDENT LE BRUN is still President of France.

The major criticism Resistance Groups in France level at Algiers is that too much time is given to minor political debates among representatives of a defunct Parliament.

People inside France will believe in the French Army only when it has proven victorious in battle in continental Europe. Great disappointment has been felt over the part played by French troops in Italy. Many Resistance leaders regret this attitude

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towards the army, pointing to the equally slow progress of Anglo-American Armies in Italy. All end on the note that only the Russians have proved their military value.

The rank and file members of the resistance organizations are recruited from the peasant and worker masses.

The peasantry is anti-German but non-suffering. Their position is guided by material considerations. They have, however, proved helpful to resistance groups. (The Maquis survive due to their support.) They fear post-war political disorders and want a strong government to maintain order. They have an affectionate regard for PETAIN as a fatherly leader who has tried to save France by minor tricks and opposition tactics after the Army's collapse. This support is only sentimental.

The workers have suffered most under occupation. They oppose both Germany and Vichy. Food and necessities are lacking in the cities. Suffering is great. If internal disorder is to be avoided, food should be on hand for distribution to the working classes in the cities when the Germans are defeated. Delphi is certain that if this is not done, there will be a Communist uprising and a resultant reign of terror. The worker thinks and speaks only of the adequate food and normal living conditions the Americans alone can bring. It is important that we not fail them. Although there are few militant Communists and almost no Communist

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leaders, there is among workers and peasants a latent sympathy for Communism, in theory and as applied to the other fellow, and this is enhanced by Russian military success.

The workers want government reform with properly organized trade unions a part of the governing authority. This demand is second only to adequate wage levels. They have urged such of their number as reach safety to plead with Algiers, London and Washington for food for the cities if order is to be maintained.

A serious internal problem is German demoralization of civilians in the north and east. In Alsace the children have been taught only Nazi tenets. Girls have been encouraged to accept German advances to the point that a whole new generation of Germans is being born and it is rare to see a girl or woman over 14 who is not with child. The more determined elements of the resistance movements come from Alsace and Lorraine. They operate in central France in preparation for their return to their homeland.

Summary

France overwhelmingly wants DE GAULLE. He has promised on his return to surround himself with a truly French government representative of those who stayed in France and resisted the invader. Parliament has lost its prestige and won't regain it. The French do not want a return of the Third Republic. A French Army must land in France, and the resistance groups must be assured

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they are not being asked to risk their lives without being integrated in the general strategy of the invasion. They want concrete acts, not propaganda. The first step must be to give them arms.

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13 March 1944

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT FROM ARGUS TO REGIS ON CONVERSATION
WITH FRENCH RESISTANCE LEADER

In further conversation with Delphi, he made two further points:

One is that the reign of terror is gaining momentum. The unspeakable tortures used against members of the Resistance Groups and their families, where even women and children are subjected to the most fiendish cruelties, have provoked the anger of the French people. Savagery is re-appearing everywhere, and there is an iron determination on the part of these people to fight against their oppressors. The French "Milice" from Haute-Savoie indicates that the Germans and the "Milice" are now executing patriots without trial.

The other point of interest is the constant collaboration of the French movement known as "Compagnons de France" with the Resistance Groups. This organization, which had the blessing of Vichy, was long used as a cloak for obtaining supplies and equipment for the Resistance Movement but was abolished early in January. Its members and leaders have in many instances joined the Resistance Underground.

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